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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH D. MAACK,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, and ROBERT K. JARVIK,

No. 930064-CA
Priority 15

Defendants/Appellees.
Plaintiffs/Appellants Robert D. Maack and Judith D. Maack (the
"Maacks") submit the following Appellants1 Reply to Jarvik 1 s Brief:
DETERMINATIVE RULE
The only

determinative

constitutional

provision,

statute,

ordinance or rule is U.R.C.P. 56, which is attached as Exhibit "A."
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is an appeal from a Motion for Summary Judgment wherein
the District Court held that there existed "no genuine issue of any
material fact" and that Jarvik was entitled to judgment on all
issues as a matter of law.
1.

The principal claims were as follows:

Builder? s Warranty:

There is no dispute of fact that

JarvikTs real estate agent, Maclyn Kesselring, represented that the
home was subject to a "builder's warranty" covering all defects in
the construction.

The warranty did not run between Jarvik and the

buyers; it ran between the builder (Hoagland) and the buyers and,
therefore,

was

not

included

in

the

Earnest

Money

Agreement.

Although the Buyers1 Complaint alleged recovery on theories of
contract, estoppel, misrepresentation, negligent and/or intentional
non-disclosure, breach of duty or good faith and fair dealing, the
District Court held the misrepresentation regarding the "builder's
warranty" was irrelevant because the parol evidence rule would not
permit

evidence

of

misrepresentation

in

the

negotiations

and

because the Maacks were not "justified" in relying upon the agent's
misrepresentation.

The

Earnest

Money

Contract

did

contain

provision allowing for a preclosing "inspection" of the home.

a

The

evidence showed the Maacks waived their right of inspection in
reliance on the "builder's warranty".

Nevertheless, the District

Court held as a matter of law that the Maacks were not justified in
their reliance.
2.

Fraudulent Concealment:

There is no dispute that the

builder (Hoagland) and the owner (Jarvik) discussed the fact that
the

exterior

stucco

materials

Jarvik

selected

for

the

house

(because it was cheap) were not proper building materials for a
Utah (i.e., a freeze/thaw) climate. There is no dispute that prior
to listing the house for sale, the builder (Hoagland) and the owner
(Jarvik) determined that they had a major problem with excessive
cracking in the stucco on the exterior surface of the home.

There

is no question that prior to listing the home for sale they decided
to apply a "skim coat" of stucco like material to hide and conceal
the excessive cracking in the stucco.
2

Thereafter, the home was

listed for sale with the stucco cracking problem concealed.

There

is evidence in the record that the cost of repairing the stucco
problem alone exceeded $50,000.

Plaintiffs contended that hiding

the defects in the stucco constitutes a fraudulent concealment in
light of the fact that Jarvik disclosed some of the minor problems
in the stucco but not the major ones.
The Court held as a matter of law that the terms of the
Earnest
liability
defects.

Money

Agreement

totally

exculpated

Jarvik

from

all

for affirmative acts of fraud or concealment of the
In short, the District Court determined that the "as is"

provision in the Earnest Money Agreement is a total shield to any
conduct on the part of the seller.

The Maacks respectfully suggest

that the "as is" clause is not a resurrection of the caveat emptor
doctrine and that in this case the seller, Jarvik, has exceeded the
protection of the "as is" clause with his representation as to the
"one year builder's warranty" and his affirmative "concealment" of
defects.
The Parol Evidence Rule contains an exception
Extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove fraud.

for fraud.

A contractual

provision cannot protect a person against his own fraud.

JarvikTs

misrepresentation concerning the "builder's warranty" through his
agent is not the only issue in this case.
concealed

defects

in the exterior

stucco.

Jarvik intentionally
He disclosed

some

defects, but actively hid the remaining substantial latent defects.

3

Not only did the Maacks have claims against Jarvik based upon
misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, but the facts also
support

a claim

covenant of good

against

Jarvik

faith and

based

upon his

breach

fair dealing, a covenant

of

the

in every

contract entered into in the State of Utah, the breach of which
allows for a separate cause of action.
Jarvikfs Brief is a confession that disputed material facts
exist, precluding the entry of summary judgment.
supports

the

existence

of

the

Maacks1

The record amply

version

of

the

facts

establishing fraud and fraudulent concealment.
The determination of whether the Maacks were negligent at all,
let alone reaching the point of a legal conclusion that their lack
of diligence barred their claims, is something that is factually
intense and cannot be resolved on a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Furthermore,
Kesselring,
statutory

the
a

Maacks

reputable

obligation

misrepresentation

were
real
to

concerning

entitled
estate

avoid
the

warranty."

4

to

agent.
making

existence

rely

upon

She
any
of

is

Maclyn
under

a

substantial
a

"builder's

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE "AS IS" PROVISION IN THE EARNEST
MONEY SALES AGREEMENT AND THE PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE CANNOT SHIELD JARVIK
FROM A FRAUD CLAIM.
Point II of Jarvikfs Brief on pages 15 through 18 essentially
makes an argument that the Earnest Money Sales Agreement is an
integrated contract, the Parol Evidence Rule precludes "extrinsic
evidence

concerning

prior

or

contemporaneous

conversations,

representations or statements," and the "as is" clause, inspection,
warranty

provisions

of

the

sales

agreement

are

clear

and

unambiguous, and preclude the Maacks from proceeding in this case.
In Union

Bank

v.

Swenson,

707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), the Utah

Supreme Court made it clear that fraud is an exception to the Parol
Evidence Rule:
The parol evidence rule as a principle of
contract interpretation has a very narrow
application. Simply stated, the rule operates
in
the
absence
of
fraud
to
exclude
contemporaneous conversations, statements, or
representations offered for the purpose of
varying or adding to the terms and an
integrated
contract. . . .
This general rule as stated contains an
exception for fraud.
Parol evidence is
admissible to show the circumstances under
which the contract was made or the purpose for
which the writing was executed.
This is so
even after the writing is determined to be an
integrated contract. Admitting parol evidence
in such circumstances avoids the judicial
enforcement of a writing that appears to be a
binding integration but in fact is not.
5

What appears to be a complete
and binding integrated agreement may
be a forgery, a joke, a sham, or an
agreement without consideration, or
it may be voidable for fraud,
duress, mistake, or the like, or it
may be illegal. Such invalidating
causes need not and commonly do not
appear on the fact of the writing.
Restatement
(Second)
comment C (1981).
Id.

of

Contracts

§

214

at 665 (emphasis added).
Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court in Lamb v.

Bangart,

525 P. 2d

602 (Utah 1974), found that a contractual provision limiting the
plaintiff's remedy did not bar a fraud action:
[A] contract clause limiting liability will
not be applied in a fraud action.
The law
does not permit a covenant of immunity which
will protect a person against his own fraud on
the ground of public policy.
A contract
limitation on damages or remedies is valid
only in the absence of allegations or proof of
fraud.
Id.

at

608

(emphasis

added).

The

law

in

other

states

is

consistent.1
Further, there is only a rebuttable presumption

that the

Earnest Money Sales agreement, which on its face appears to be an
integrated agreement, is what is appears to be. 2
demonstrated,

and

Jarvik

has

conceded,

that

The Maacks have
not

all

of

the

1
Lusk Corp. v. Burgess,
85 Ariz. 90, 332 P. 2d 493, 495
(1958); P.E.A.C.E.
Corp.
v. Oklahoma Natural
Gas Co.,
568 P. 2d
1273, 1276 (Okl. 1977); Moore v. Swanson,
556 P.2d 1249, 1253
(Mont. 1976).
2

Union

Bank

v.

Swenson,

707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985).
6

agreements between the parties concerning

the purchase of the

property are contained in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement.

For

example, Jarvik conceded that his agent was authorized to point out
the defects in the parapet stucco and assure any potential buyer
that those would be remedied.

The Maacks have also established,

and the record does not contradict, the representation made to them
concerning the builder's warranty, upon which they relied in not
obtaining an inspection.

These facts establish that there is at

least a dispute as to whether the Earnest Money Sales Agreement
was, as it purported on its face to be, an integrated contract.
The record does not include a specific factual determination that
it was, or was not, an integrated contract.

That alone virtually

mandates a reversal of this case.3
Jarvik?s

argument,

misconstruing

Utah

law

to

allow

the

commission of fraud is as long as an "as is" or similar clause as
contained in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, is an example of
his predatory approach in dealing with the Maacks.

He incorrectly

assumed that as long as he had an "as is" clause, anything he or
his agent said or did or anything that he intentionally concealed
would be blessed by the judicial system.
There

is

a

factual

dispute

as

to

whether

Kesselring's

misrepresentation to the Maacks was made before or after the Maacks

Id.

at 665-66.
7

signed the Earnest Money Sales Agreement.4 Paragraph B of

the

Earnest Money Sales Agreement states as follows:
B. INSPECTION.
Unless otherwise indicated,
Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said
property upon Buyer's own examination and
judgment
and
not
by
reason
of
any
representation made to Buyer by Seller or the
Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its
condition, size, location, present value,
future value, income herefrom or as to its
production. Buyer accepts the property in "as
is" condition subject to Seller's warranties
as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer
desires
any
additional
inspection,
said
inspection shall be allowed by Seller but
arranged for and paid for by Buyer.
(R. 1844; emphasis added).
address

the

reliance

This language specifically does not

"builder's warranty,"

upon

representations

being

"as

to

limited
its

to

precluding

[referring

to

the

properties] condition, size, location, present value, future value,
income

herefrom

or

as

production."

The

prohibition

in

the

inspection clause, therefore, does not cover the representation
that was made.
any

It does not say that the Buyers cannot rely upon

representation

the sales agent makes.

Further,

the

last

sentence in the clause must be construed to give it meaning; it
cannot be construed in such a way as to write it out of the Earnest
Money

Sales

Agreement.5

If

the Maacks

had

the

right

to

an

C.f.
Affidavit of Robert D. Maack in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Robert K.
Jarvik ir 4 (R. 1760) with the Affidavit of Maclyn Kesselring 1Mr 7
& 8 (R. 1841-42).
5

Verhoof

v. Askiton,

740 P. 2d 1342, 1344 (Utah App. 1987).

8

additional inspection, and Kesselring made the representation as to
the builder's warranty after the Earnest Money Sales Agreement was
signed, as she contends, then the proper reading of this language
would

require

that

the Maacks

be

allowed

to back

out

of

or

renegotiate the deal if the inspection reveals material defects.
To construe it otherwise would essentially read it out of the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, making this post-execution right of
inspection meaningless.
POINT II.
THE COVENANT GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING IS INDEPENDENT OF OTHER
CLAUSES CONTAINED IN THE EARNEST
MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in every
contract, and the breach of this covenant is a separate cause of
action, independent of a claim for breach of the express provisions
of

the

contract.

This

cardinal

principle

exists

beyond

any

reasonable debate in Utah.6
The application of the good faith covenant is not selective on
a case-by-case basis, depending upon the facts and contractual
language

in

any

given

case,

as

Jarvik

mistakenly

suggests.

Instead, it exists in every contract, regardless of the nature of

St. Benedict's
Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict' s Hosp. , 811 P.2d
194 (Utah 1991); Resource
Management Co. v. Western
Ranch and
Livestock
Co., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985); Beck v. Farmers
Ins.
Exch.,
701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); Leigh Furniture
& Carpet Co. v.
Isom,

677 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).

9

the contract or the facts presented.

The treatise Corbin on

Contracts observes:
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
a constructive condition imposed on all
contracts and, as such, has nothing to do with
implied terms. As a requirement of law, such
conditions are always to be seen as in the
contemplation
of
the
parties,
and
justification
for them
in the
contract
language need not be looked for.
3 Corbin on Contracts 1f 541 at 85 (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
Jarvik

suggests

that

clauses

in

the

Earnest

Money

Sales

Agreement, as a matter of law, preclude the Maacksf claim based
upon the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as if it was not
a condition the parties contemplated.7

Substantial evidence,

however, supports the conclusion that Jarvik in fact breached the
covenant

of

good

faith

and

fair

dealing.

substantial defects in the exterior stucco.

Jarvik

knew

of

He was warned against

the use of a cement-based stucco in the Salt Lake City climate,
insisted

that

it

be

used

nevertheless,

insisted

that

it

be

improperly applied without expansion joints, and then ordered the
contractor to skim coat it when the inevitable cracks appeared in
the

surface

of

the

stucco

so

that

detectable by a prospective purchaser.

the

defect

would

not

be

He then disclosed to the

Maacks the existence of some minor defects in the exterior stucco.
Specifically, those defects in the parapet over the garage, but
7

Jarvik T s Brief at 1-2 (Statement of Issue No. 1) and at

18.
10

failed to disclose the remaining, substantial defects, that shortly
after the Maacks purchased the house require the replacement of all
the

exterior

stucco.

He

intentionally

gave

the

impression that they were buying a well-built home.
it was

not

properly

constructed,

that

it was

Maacks

the

He knew that

constructed

in

violation of the plans and specifications, and yet he did not
disclose any of those facts. Nevertheless, Jarvik asserts that the
"as is" clause

relieves him

from

liability

for breaching

the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
POINT III.
JARVIKfs CLAIMS THAT THE MAACKS HAVE
IMPROPERLY
"RAISED
UNCONTESTED
FACTS" AND THAT THE MAACKS1 CLAIM
THAT JARVIK IS LIABLE UNDER TORT LAW
IS "BASED ON FALSE STATEMENTS" ARE A
CONFESSION
OF
ERROR
IN
THE
PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE
DISTRICT
COURT.
A.

Jarvik Concedes the Existence of Disputed Material Facts.

JarvikTs Brief at 15 makes the unorthodox suggestion that the
Summary of Judgment in his favor should be summarily

affirmed

because the Brief of Appellants raises "numerous allegations which
are not

uncontested

facts

and

are extraneous."8

Jarvik

also

suggests that the "claim that Dr. Jarvik is liable under tort law

8

Jarvikfs Brief at 15.
11

because he made fraudulent assertions through his realtor, Maclyn
Kesselring" is false.9
These two assertions conclusively demonstrate that the entry
of a Summary Judgment against the Maacks was inappropriate:

(1)

the existence of disputed material facts precludes the entry of a
summary judgment under U.R.C.P. 56; and (2) the only way a disputed
factual assertion can be proven "false" is after a trial on the
merits, which would preclude the entry of summary judgment in
either party's favor.
Jarvik goes on to make the ludicrous assertion that the facts
supporting the fraud claims against him were false as demonstrated
by

the

District

statement.10

Court's

Obviously,

finding
in

as

deciding

stated
a

in

Motion

its
for

Rule

52

Summary

Judgment, the District Court is precluded from making findings of
fact based upon contested matters.
Finally, Jarvik suggests that there was no evidence of defect
is included among the undisputed facts the Trial Court considered

9

Jarvik ? s Brief at 21.

10
Jarvik T s Brief at 21-22. Jarvik also complains he was
not given an opportunity to review
his deposition transcript,
claiming that this was the Maacks? fault for some reason. Jarvik ? s
Brief at 9. First, the citations are to facts undisputed before
the Trial Court. Jarvik never contradicted the facts supported by
the deposition cites. Second, Jarvik was represented by counsel at
that time. If there was a problem, his counsel ?should have cured
it.
Third, the basis for establishing Jarvik s fraud is from
Hoagland f s deposition where Hoagland testified that he told Jarvik
that switching to a cement-basea stucco was inappropriate and that
Jarvik ordered the cracked stucco to be skim coated.
Finally,
Jarvik waived the right to review the deposition transcript by not
returning it within thirty days pursuant to U.R.C.P. 30(e).

12

in granting summary judgment in his favor.

To the contrary, a

quick review of the Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Robert K.
Jarvikfs Motion for Summary Judgment, Additional Material Facts (R.
1949-52) demonstrates that the defects concerning the stucco were
placed before the District Court.12

Jarvik did nothing to dispute

those additional material facts raised in opposition to his Motion
for Summary Judgment.13
B.

Jarvik Did Not Raise Any Issue Relating to the Maacks?
Diligence in the Memorandum in Support of His Motion for
Summary Judgment or in His Reply, but Raised the Issue
Surreptitiously by Sending a Letter to the Court Without
Copying the Maacks f Counsel.

On the issue of the Maacks1 due diligence, an interesting
sequence of events developed

in the hearings held

District Court on May 6 & 7, 1992.14
Judgment

and

the Memorandum

before

Jarvik's Motion for Summary

in Support of Motion

for

Judgment were both filed on March 27, 1992 (R. 1616-32).
same day, this Court decided Klas
(Utah App. 1992).

the

v.

Van Wagoner,

Summary
On that

829 P.2d 135

Not surprisingly, Jarvik's Motion for Summary

Judgment does not raise any issue concerning the Maacks1 diligence,

Jarvik f s Brief at 9.
12
Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Additional Material
Facts of the Memorandum in Opposition to Robert K. Jarvikfs Motion
for Summary Judgment (R. 1949-52).
13

Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Robert K. JarviK*s Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
zuoy*"^iz ) .
14

Court Proceedings Transcript Volumes II & III (R. 2355-

2464).
13

and therefore, the Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Robert K.
Jarvik's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1948-63) did not address
that issue.

Jarvik did not even bother to raise the diligence

issue in his Memorandum

in Reply to Plaintiffs1

Memorandum

Opposition to Defendant Robert K. Jarvik's Motion

in

for Summary

Judgment (R. 2039-42) filed on April 29, 1992.15
The first time Jarvik raised the diligence issue was in a
surreptitious letter to the District Court enclosing a copy of the
Klas
that

v.

Van Wagoner

letter.16

case, but not copying any counsel of record on

Nevertheless,

the

issue was

argued,

with

the

Maacks bringing to the Courtf s attention certain facts relevant to
the

issue,

including

Jarvik's

intentional

concealment

of

the

defects in the exterior stucco by ordering Hoagland to skim coat
it.17

For Jarvik to complain that insufficient evidence exists in

the record to dispute the diligence issue is outrageous given the
fact that it was raised for the first time in an improper ex

parte

Even raising the diligence issue on the Reply Memorandum

would be improper.

E.g.,

White

v.

Kent Medical

Center,

Inc.,

61

Wash. App. 163, 810 P. 2d 4,8 (1991). The Maacks objected to going
forward with Jarvik's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Court
Proceedings Transcript Volume II at 36-37 (lines 19-25 & 1-8) (R.
2357-58).
16

Court Proceedings Transcript Volume II at 36-37 (lines
19-25 & 1-8).
17

Court Proceedings Transcript Volume III at 133 (lines 5-

16).
14

communication with the Court by his letter to the Judge dated May
5, 1992, one day before the scheduled hearing.18
C.

The Record Supports the Existence of the Maacks' Version
of the Facts Establishing Fraud.

Jarvik criticizes the Brief of Appellants for not properly
citing the record under U.R.C.P. 24. 19

Jarvik then goes on to

cite many of the same portions of the records as cited in the Brief
of Appellants to support his own position.

Most notable is the

Affidavit of Maclyn Kesselring (R. 1841-42). 20

The Court should

also note that Jarvik?s Brief makes many factual assertions without
any citation to the record.
Brief

falls

under

the

If the factual assertion in Jarvikfs

definition

of

hyperbole,

and

in

many

locations where it does not, there is simply no citation to the
record to support his facts.
The Affidavit of Maclyn Kesselring clearly establishes that
she represented to the Maacks that a builder's warranty existed.
She also informed the Maacks that the stucco on the parapets was
defective and that Jarvik would repair it. Without any citation to
the record, Jarvik contends that this representation to the Maacks

The date of Jarvik f s letter is only one day before the
May 6, 1992, hearing where it was raised for tne first time. Court
Proceedings Transcript Volume II at 36-37 (lines 19-25 & 1-3).
Furthermore, while every other letter sent to the Court appears in
the record, for some reason Jarvikfs letter has been omitted.
19

Jarvik's Brief at 15.

20

This affidavit is cited in Jarvikfs Brief at 21 n.24.
15

through their realtor was limited and describes in detail how the
defective stucco would be fixed:
He informed the Maacks via his realtor that he
had ordered a metal flashing cap (at $1,200
including installation) for the parapet around
the garage and that he would go ahead and pay
for it since work on it was in progress.21
There

is nothing

in the record

that would

indicate

that

the

representation was so limited.
Further, Jarvik does nothing to dispute the following facts:
1.

Jarvik

wanted

to

save

money

and

therefore

ordered

Hoagland to use a cement-based stucco, as opposed to the
acrylic stucco;22
2.

Hoagland

told

inappropriate

him
for

that
the

the

cement-based

climate

and

stucco

would

was

deteriorate

rapidly;23
3.

21

Jarvik

ordered

Hoagland

stucco

without

expansion

Jarvik*s

admission.

Brenteson

Brief

at

24.

Wholesale,

to

install

joints,

This

Inc.

v.

the

cement-based

despite

constitutes

Arizona

Hoagland?s

a

Public

Co.,
166 Ariz. 519, 803 P.2d 930 (Ariz. App. 1990).
App. P. 40(a).

See

judicial

Service
Utah R.

22
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Robert K. Jarvik ? s
Motion for Summary Judgment, Additional Material Facts 1MF 1-4 (R.
1949-50); Jarvik did not dispute these facts in the Memorandum in
Reply to Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Robert
K. Jarvik T s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 2039-42).
23

Id.

(R. 1950).
16

protest that was an improper installation technique;24
and
4.

At Jarvikfs direction, Hoagland applied a skim-coat over
the cracks in the stucco so that they could not be seen
by a potential buyer.25

D.

Jarvik!s Intent to Fraudulently Conceal is Supported by
the Record.

Jarvikfs intentional fraudulent concealment is demonstrated in
three aspects of the record.

First, the builder of the home,

Hoagland, told him that applying a cement-base stucco in this
climate without expansion joints was improper and would result in
a defective stucco application.

Second, after the defects in the

stucco started to appear, based on Hoaglandfs prediction, Jarvik
ordered

that they be skim-coated;

inferentially,

a jury could

conclude that the purpose of the skim-coating was to conceal the
defects from a potential buyer. Third, after Jarvik made a partial
disclosure of the defects in the stucco in the parapet over the
garage, he was under an obligation to make a complete disclosure of
all of the facts.
Kesselring,

he

While he may not have spoken directly to Maclyn

certainly

did

talk

to

Eager

& Associates

and

Memorandum in Opposition to defendant Robert K. Jarvik?s
Motion for Summary Judgment, Additional Material Facts 1Mf 1-4 (R.
1949-50); Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Third-Party
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Statement of Fact If 6 (R.
1995); Court Proceedings Transcript Volume III at 133 (lines 5-14
(R. 2454).
25

Court Proceedings Volume III at 133 (lines 1-16) (R.

2454).
17

instructed them to disclose the defect in the parapets and his
intentions to repair those for the new buyer.
Jarvik goes on to cite as authority Restatement Second of
Torts § 551(2)(b) (1977).26

This, undoubtedly,

Utah, something even Jarvik must concede.27

is the law in

While admittedly it

is a disputed fact as to whether Jarvik knew of the defects in the
stucco, Jarvik cannot resolve that issue by merely asserting that
he did not know.

Jarvik's Brief at 24 admits that "[h]e informed

the Maacks via his realtor that he had ordered a metal flashing cap
(at $1,200 including

installation) for the parapet around

the

garage and that he would go ahead and pay for it since work on it
was in progress."

This was the work that was necessary to repair

the defective stucco.

Hoagland told Jarvik that the rest of the

stucco was defective.

Jarvik did not disclose that critical fact

to the Maacks.
POINT IV.
WHETHER THE PURPORTED NEGLIGENCE OF
THE MAACKS PRECLUDE THEIR CLAIMS
AGAINST JARVIK ONLY CAN BE RESOLVED
BY THE TRIER OF FACT.
Jarvik asserts that "[t]he trial court concluded that the
plaintiffs' did not act with due diligence and that plaintiffs did

26

27

Corp.,

Jarvik f s Brief at 24; Brief of Appellants at 44.

First

Security

Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry

786 P.2d 1326, 1330-31 (Utah 1990).
18

Development

not, in fact, rely on the 'builders warranty' representation."
Finding

that

the

Maacks

did

not

act

with

due

diligence

tantamount to concluding that they were negligent.

Generally,

summary judgment is improper on the issue of negligence.29
only authority that Jarvik cites for this proposition is Klas
Van

Wagoner,

Wagoner

The Klas

829 P. 2d 135 (Utah App. 1992).

case was an appeal from a three-day trial.

Id.

is

v.

The
v.
Van

at 136. One

of the defendants, Mark 0. Van Wagoner, is an attorney.

Jarvikfs

assertion that Mr. Maack is an attorney is correct.30

The key

factual

dispute

in

Klas

v.

Van

Wagoner

misunderstanding between the defendants
Carol [Klas] regarding the 'appraisals.'"

"was

an

apparent

[the Van Wagoners] and
Id.

at 137.

The Van

Wagoners understood the term to mean formal, written appraisals,
and Carol Klas indicated that she was considering any opinion,
whether verbal or written, given as to the value of the property,
to be an "appraisal."
The Klas

v.

Van Wagoner

case was not a trial based upon fraud.

Rather, the primary legal principle upon which the case was decided
was unilateral mistake and the remedy sought was rescission.

28

Jarvik's Brief at 18-19.

29

Kitchen

1991).

v.

Cal

Gas

Co.,

30

This

821 P.2d 458, 461 (Utah App.

The suggestion in Jarvik's Brief that Mr. Maack "is a
lawyer with experience in commercial matters," whatever that means,
is not supported by footnote 22 in Jarvik's Brief citing the Notice
of Appearance of Counsel Robert Maack (R. 322-23).
19

was not a case involving fraudulent concealment or breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing.

The discussion of the buyer's

diligence, a necessary element to sustain rescission on the grounds
of unilateral mistake, clearly indicates that the representations
made to the Van Wagoners did not discourage them from obtaining
their own

"appraisal."

Furthermore, the clear basis

for

the

decision was that not every unilateral mistake entitles the buyer
to relief, suggesting that the Van Wagoners "bore the risk of a
mistake

as to the value

Id.

of the property."

at

141 n.8.

Finally, while the Utah Court of Appeals did affirm the dismissal
of

the

Van

Wagoner's

counterclaim

for

fraud

and

misrepresentation,31 whether the Maacks' actions in this case rose
the level of ordinary diligence is a factually intensive issue
capable of resolution only through a trial.
Maclyn Kesselring is a reputable real estate agent.
under

a

statutory

obligation

to

avoid

making

any

She was

substantial

misrepresentation,32 something upon which the Maacks are entitled
to rely.

The Rule of Caveat Emptor does not apply to those dealing

with licensed real estate agents. A real estate agent hired by the

31

1992).

Klas

v.

Van Wagoner,

829 P.2d 135, 141 n.9 (Utah App.

32

Maclyn Kesselring's real estate license is subject to
suspension or revocation if she is found guilty of "making any
substantial misrepresentation" or "making any false promises of a
character likely to influence, persuade or induce."
Utah Code
Anno. § 61-2-ll(l)&(2)(1991).
20

vendor is expected to be honest, ethical, and competent and is
answerable at law for breaches of his or her statutory duty to the
public,33

Kesselring

assured

the

Maacks

that

there

was

a

builder's warranty, but did not disclose the name of the builder.
There was no independent basis from which these facts could be
derived by any reasonable inquiry on the Maacksf

part because

Kesselring and Jarvik were in sole possession of the underlying
facts necessary to investigate the claim. Whether an investigation
is necessary at all under these circumstances and, if necessary,
how thorough that investigation needed to be, are factual disputes
a jury needs to resolve.
suggest

that

the Maacks

With Jarvik living in New York, to simply
should

have

requested

a copy

of

the

builder's warranty is the sort of determination that can only be
made after a trial in this case.
Jarvik concedes that his agent, Kesselring, represented to the
Maacks that a builder's warranty existed.

The representation that

a builder's warranty existed discouraged the Maacks from exercising
their right to inspect the property prior to closing.
intent of the representation.
existed.

That was the

He concedes that no such warranty

To suggest that a licensed real estate agent can make

false representations and the buyer is under an obligation to
ferret out what is true from what is false, at his peril, is
inconsistent with the principle that buyers should not be defrauded
33

Dugan v.

Jones,

615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980).
21

and that contracts should be negotiated in good faith.

To accept

Jarvik!s position that the buyer's diligence can be resolved on a
motion for summary judgment would invite sharp business practices
and numerous false representations to be made in the course of
sales transactions in this State. Unless this Court is prepared to
conclude, as a matter of law, that every representation a real
estate sales agent or any sales person makes requires the buyer, as
a

matter

of

being

reasonably

diligent,

to

have

that

oral

representation backed up in writing, then the trial court's ruling
must be reversed.
Furthermore,

Jarvik's

misrepresentation

concerning

"builder's warranty" is not the only issue in this case.

the

Jarvik

revealed a portion of the defects in the stucco, while concealing
the remaining, major defects, and even going to the extreme of
having the surface of the stucco skim-coated to conceal cracks.
the

Maacks

checked

each

and

every

one

of

Ms.

If

Kesselring's

representations, and after going through that effort were able to
determine that there was no builder's warranty, they naturally
would have had the building inspected by a general contract.

With

the skim-coating in place, covering up the latent defects in the
stucco, the question becomes whether a general contractor would
have been able to determine that something was amiss.

In all

likelihood, a general contractor would have been able to do so, but
that remains a factual issue in the case.
22

Finally, simply because Mr. Maack is an attorney should not
change the outcome of this appeal.

Otherwise, this Court will

impose a duty upon attorneys to cross-examine every salesman with
whom they deal, insisting upon written documentation of every
representation the salesman makes in a way that only would imply
that the salesman was dishonest. This would exacerbate the already
existing problem of the public's negative perception of lawyers.
CONCLUSION
The Parol Evidence Rule does not protect Jarvik or anyone else
who has committed fraud by prohibiting extrinsic evidence necessary
to

prove

the

fraud.

When

someone

like

Jarvik

intentionally

conceals defects in a structure or intentionally misrepresents the
existence of a builder's warranty, evidence of that fraud will not
be found in the four corners of the written contract between the
buyer and seller.

The fraud exception to the parol evidence rule

is well established.

The "as is" and similar provisions in the

Earnest Money Sales Agreement, therefore, did not preclude any of
the Maacks' claims against Jarvik.
Jarvik's failure to disclose to the Maacks the substantial
defects in the exterior stucco of the home constitute a breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Jarvik disclosed

minor defects in the stucco, while concealing

the

substantial

defects that would require the replacement of the exterior stucco
shortly after the Maacks moved into the home.
23

The "as is" clause

and similar contractual provisions do not eliminate the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
The Maacks exercised reasonable diligence, but in any event
this factually intensive inquiry cannot be resolved on summary
judgment.

They were entitled to rely upon Maclyn Kesselring, a

reputable real estate agent, who is under a statutory obligation to
avoid

making

any

substantial

"builder's warranty."

misrepresentation

concerning

The rule of caveat emptor does not apply to

those dealing with a licensed real estate agent.

Further, the

misrepresentation concerning the "builder's warranty,"
egregious

is

the

the

least

of

Jarvik's

fraudulent

although

activities,

especially when contrasted against his active concealment of the
defects in the exterior stucco.

He disclosed some, but actively

concealed the remaining, considerably more serious defects.

This

Court should reverse the District Court's Order Granting Jarvik's
Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

and

remand

the

case

for

further

proceedings consistent with this Court's ruling. The remand should
include a direction that the case go to trial.
DATED:

March 2, 1993.
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS

fk/l /?. U,*^
fiar^c A'. Larsen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
Robert D. Maack and Judith D. Maack
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Pursuant

to

Rule

21(d) of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure, I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the APPELLANTS' REPLY TO JARVIK'S BRIEF to be mailed to
the following individuals on March 2, 1993:
K.M. Frankenburg, Esq.
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Robert K. Jarvik, M.D.
124 West 60th Street
New York, New York 10023

4
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Rule 56

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);

J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§§1152 to 1213.
^ R 1 f l . . 01fl

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
^55
Failure to give notice of application for de-

bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d
!070
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendants right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

by custom 28 A.L.R 3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. —- Judgment «=» 92 to 134

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
168

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 56

action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
—Experts.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Objection.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facts.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.

Appeal.
—Adversely affected party.
—Standard of review.
Attorney's fees.
Availability of motion.
Cross-motions.
Damages.
Discovery.
Disputed facts.
Evidence.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Weight of testimony.
Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Lease as security.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
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FILED WSTKCTC0011T
Third Judicial District

MAY 1 9 1992
(\

Robert Jarvik, M.D.
124 W 60 Street
New York, NY 10023
Telephone: (212) 265-8172

SALT£AKECtHJNTY

v.

DtpulyCtock

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH
D. MAACK,

JUDGEMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

*
*

RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION
INC., a Utah Company, and
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an
individual

*
*
*
*

Civil No. 900903201CV
Consolidated Cases

*

Defendants.

*

Hon. Pat B. Brian

*
*

ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH
D. MAACK
Plaintiffs

*
*
*

*
*
*

vs.
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D.
Defendant

*
*

002137

The Court, having made its rule 52 Statement and Order,
which are incorporated herein by this reference, hereby enters
judgement against Plaintiffs for no cause of action, on each and
every claim asserted against Defendant Robert Jarvik. Pursuant to
Rule 54(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, costs are awarded to
defendant Jarvik in the amount of $

v

.

Pursuant to defendant's affidavit submitted in accord with
Rule 4-505, the Court awards legal fees in the amount of $

yA

to defendant Jarvik.

DATED this 11th day of May, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

,.

/? A /° _ ^ss\

HONORABLE PAT Bv--BRIAN
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDG

-4f.TL'%

002138

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid on
this 11th day of May, 1992, to the following:
Mark A. Larsen
Campbell, Maack & Sessions
One Utah Center — 1300
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
K.M. Frankenburg, E sq
Williams & Hunt
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
PO Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Michael F. Heyrend d

IMP

310 "EM S t r e e t
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84103

$21-11

<4£

Paul D. Newman
Snell & Wilmer
60 East South Temple, Suit*
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Robert Jarvik,
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Robert Jarvik, M.D.
124 W 60 Street
New York, NY 10023
Telephone: (212) 265-8172
III THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH
D. MAACK,
Plaintiffs,

*

RULE 52 STATEMENT OF
GROUNDS AND ORDER FOR
GRANTING DEFENDANT ROBERT
JARVIK1S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AGAINST
PLAINTIFFS

*

vs.
*

RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCT
INC., a Utah Company, and
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an
individual
Defendants.

Consolidated Cases

*
*
*
*

Hon. Pat B. Brian
Civil No. 900903201CV

ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH
D. MAACK
Plaintiffs
*
*
*

vs.
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D.
Defendant
1.

*

The Motion for Summary Judgement filed fay Defendant Robert

Jarvik

("Jarvji Ik1 ) un

or about March

24, 1992

came on for

hearing before the Court, pursuant to notice, on May
Plaintiff Robert D. Maack was present and represented by counsel,
Mark A, Larsen, Plaintiff Judith D
1

Maack was represented by

ichael

Teyrend

Defendant

Resource

Design

&

Construction, Inc. ("Resource Design") and Timothy Hoagland were
represented by counsel, Kur'
rejpi; e s e n t . e d

I i i nise I I

.niiii ,1!

p

Frankenburg, Defendant Jarvik

:

, ateci

o"1. »ei'

the

Lu J op lie in

,

iiin Il

Third-Party Defendant Eagar & Company was represented by counsel,
Pau]

Newman. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda filed by

the

hearing, bases i t s decision on the following grounds:

2.

There

i •.

in

|i "iiiiu i lie

dispute

with

respect

In

I lie

toll l n w u n i

material facts:
A.
During 1986, Jarvik entered a contract with Resource
Design for the construction of a home (the "Home") located on Lot
N. 5, White Hill Estates, Phase 2, which was substantially
completed by August, 1987.
B.
Jarvik entered into sales-agency contracts for the
sale of the property with Eagar on November 4, 1987, and April
14, 1988.
C.
Plaintiffs executed an Earnest Money Sales Agreement
("Agreement") on July 26, 1988, whereby they offered to purchase
the Home from Jarvik.
r

Jarvik accepted and signed the Agreement on July 27,

1988.
E.
T h e Agreement
provisions:
(]
visual
Section
present

contains

the

following

pertinent

) 2 (e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a
inspection of the property and subject to
1(c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its
physical condition, except: none.

(2) o. SELLER'S WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties
contained in Section C, the following items are also
warranted; rblank]
()
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES.
This offer is made subject to the following special
2

002141

conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied
prior to closing: This offer may be accepted In
counterpart.
(4) 11. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE
INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISIONS SECTIONS ON THE
REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE BUYER AND
SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY
REFERENCE.
P.
The Agreement contains the following pertinent General
Provisions:
(1) B . INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated,
Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property
upon Buyer's own examination and judgement and not by
reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller
or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its
condition, size, location, present value, future value,
income herefrom or as to its production. Buyer accepts
the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's
warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer
desires any additional inspection, said inspection
shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by
Buyer.
(2) C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that:
(a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any
building or zoning violation concerning the property
which has not or will not be remedied prior to closing;
(b) all obligations against the property including
taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens, or other
encumbrances of any nature shall be brought current on
or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air
conditioning, and ventilating systems, electrical
systems, and appliances shall be sound or in
satisfactory working condition at closing.
(3) L. COMPLETE AGREEMENT-NO ORAL AGREEMENTS.
This instrument constitutes the entire agreement
between the parties and supercedes and cancels any and
all prior negotiations, representations, warranties,
understandings, or agreements between the parties.
There are no oral agreements which modify or affect
this agreement. This Agreement cannot be changed except
by mutua] written agreement of the parties.
(4) N. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
... Both parties agree that should either party default in
any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the
defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise <:>] *
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accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in
pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law,
whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise.
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were any subsequent mutual written agreements between Plaintiffs
and Jarvik or Plaintiffs and Eagar.

I

Plaintiff

Robert

D.

Maack

:i s

ai

attorney

licensed

to

practice law in the State of Utah, and has practiced law in the
State of IJt Eil: i f- ::: i: mai ij years.

5.

Plaintiffs

claim

that

prior

to

the

execution

of

the

Agreement, Plaintiffs were informed b} Ma> ::::] } n Kesselring : f Eagai :
that there was a "builder's warranty" covering the Home, and that
based upon that representation, Plaintiffs did not have a general
contractor inspect the Home on their behalf.

6.

The

Agreement

does

not

condition

Plaintiffs1

offer

to

purchase the Home upon the performance an inspect!on or on an
acceptable inspection report.

7.

Plaintiffs

did

not

ask

for

a

copy

does

not

condition

of

the

"builder's

warranty".

8

The

Agreement

Plaintiffs'

offer

to

purchase the Home upon the existence of a "builder's warranty".
4
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Following purchase of the Home, the plaintiffs made demands
upon the defendant's contractor * .. correct alleged defects in the
Home

t e a c I1

-

1 i * i»111 r a i • t

• 11 in 1

f 111 n5> r

claims, stating that they relied upon oral representations made
realtor that there was a one-year builders' warranty and
that

•• mud i cii 1 repair "work . ..

r

•

•

le-

year builder's warranty." (First Amended Complaint paragraphs 612)

10.

BASED UPON the above facts, the Court concludes as follows:
(a). The Agreement is clear and unambiguous.
(b) . The Agreement is properly executed.
(c) . The

court

finds

absolutely

no

misrepresentation

or

fraud.
(d) . Plaintiffs 1
"builder's

warranty11

failure to ask for a C O D V
and

failure

to

obtain

an

inspection

constituted conduct below the level of ordinary diligence.
(e) . Plaintiffs' failure to ask for a copy of the ""ImiJiiei: " t
warranty" and failure to condition their offer to purchase the
Home on the existence of a "builder's warranty" indicate that
Plaintiffs d^f

,+ treat

np representation as material and did

not rely upon the representation when they purchased the Home.
me

integration clause of '

Agreement at Paragraph L

of the General Provisions entitled "COMPLETE AGREEMENTAGREEMENTS", is clear and unambiguous, and precludes any claims
5
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• I i f«.' mi i iifui

i.iitli r e g a r d

to all oral

agreements

prior negotiations, representations, warranties,

and all

understandings

agreements not expressly stated in the Agreement, whether made
r.
(g). One

of

the

covenants

~*

Agreement was to honor Paragraph I
enfc .

ecjt'i il """"I

the

Earnest

Money

Sales

Attempts by the plaintiffs to

m

oraj

representations made prior to closing constitute

iefault

o*

that covenant.

written agreement.

1
Motion

for Summary Judgement

on eacl 1 c f the

claims

asserted

against him by the Plaintiffs.

DATED this 11th day of May, 1992.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a tx ue ai id correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid on
this 11th day of May, 1992, to the following:
Mark A. Larsen
Campbell, Maack & Sessions
One Utah Center — 1300
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
K.M. Frankenburg, Esq.
Williams & Hunt
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
PO Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Michael F. Hey rend # 148 0'
310 "E" Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Paul D. Newman
Snell & Wilmer
60 East South Temple, Sui te 8 00
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

l*^

xSSeftTjai
Ja'rvik, M.D.
^
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